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COMMENT 
PATENT NONUSE AND TECHNOLOGY SUPPRESSION: THE 
USE OF COMPULSORY  
LICENSING TO PROMOTE PROGRESS 
 NEIL S. TYLER† 
The U.S. Supreme Court has consistently and adamantly held that patents do 
not require patentees to use or commercialize their inventions. Rather, patents 
simply grant inventors the right to exclude others from using or producing their 
inventions. That exclusive right, once granted, cannot be taken away because of a 
right holder’s failure to work the patent. Great societal harm results, however, when 
patentees fail to commercialize their patents or deliberately and strategically suppress 
technologies purely for financial gain.  
This Comment argues that utilizing compulsory licensing to combat patent 
nonuse and technology suppression can help to better achieve the primary goal of the 
Intellectual Property Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Compulsory licensing that 
compensates inventors through reasonable and marketplace-based royalty rates will 
ensure that inventors continue to develop and disclose their research and discoveries 
to the public. Furthermore, by weakening intellectual property rights on a limited 
scale, Congress can ensure that patents are made available to the highest-value 
users who can best use these patents to achieve efficient societal innovation and 
progress. This Comment therefore questions why patentees are not required to at 
least make good faith efforts to practice their patents. 
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INTRODUCTION  
 On March 19, 1787, the State of New York granted John Fitch one of the 
most famous state patents ever issued.1 For a fourteen-year term, the 
government granted Fitch a legal monopoly and the right to be the sole and 
exclusive maker and user of steamboats in New York.2 After only one year, 
however, the legislature repealed the grant because Fitch failed to adequately 
work the patent.3  
Instead of allowing the invention and its technology to enter the public 
domain, the legislature subsequently awarded Robert R. Livingston the 
exclusive right to the steamboat “for the next 20 years.”4 But over the next 
five years, Livingston also failed to produce results that satisfactorily 
                                                            
1 See 1 ERNEST BAINBRIDGE LIPSCOMB III, LIPSCOMB’S WALKER ON PATENTS § 1:7 (3d 
ed. 1984) (explaining the context and procedural history surrounding Fitch’s original patent “for 
the sole and exclusive right and privilege of making and using boats, propelled by fire or steam, 
within the waters of New York State,” and subsequently issued patents). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
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benefited society.5 Thereafter, in 1803, when Robert Fulton produced the 
Clermont,6 a steamboat that encompassed the technology claimed in Livingston’s 
patent, New York not only extended the patent for another twenty years, 
but also granted both Fulton and Livingston the right to produce 
steamboats and exclude others from using the invention.7 
At first blush, the steamboat might seem completely irrelevant to modern-
day patent jurisprudence. Under the Patent Act of 1790, individual states 
can no longer grant exclusive patent rights to inventors.8 Today, the U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) is the only agency in the United States 
permitted to grant these limited-in-time, government-approved monopolies.9 
Furthermore, only under very limited circumstances10 can patent terms be 
extended past the internationally standardized term of twenty years.11 
However, the New York steamboat patent and the state legislature’s transfer 
of patent rights to Livingston and Fulton, high-value users who were more 
capable than Fitch of producing steamboats for the benefit of society, serve 
as an example of the government’s embrace of the original purpose of 
intellectual property rights: to motivate individuals to invent through short-
term economic incentives in order to ensure extensive technological and 
societal advancement.12  
The Supreme Court has adamantly held that patents do not require that 
patentees use or commercialize their inventions.13 Patents simply grant inventors 
                                                            
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. 507, 510 (N.Y. 1812), overruled by N. River Steamboat Co. 
v. Livingston, 3 Cow. 182 (N.Y. 1825). 
8 Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 110 (1790). 
9 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (2006 & Supp. V 2012) (establishing the PTO and listing its powers 
and duties). 
10 See, e.g., Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 
98-417, 98 Stat. 1585, 1590-1602 (1984) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2006 & Supp. V 
2012)) (allowing up to five years to be restored to a patent to compensate drug patent holders for 
marketing time lost while developing the product and awaiting FDA approval). 
11 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006 & Supp. V 2012) (specifying twenty-year U.S. patent 
term); see also Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 33, opened 
for signature Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter “TRIPS”] (establishing the international 
standard patent term of twenty years for parties to the TRIPS Agreement). 
12 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (“The 
monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither unlimited nor primarily designed to 
provide a special private benefit . . . . [They are] intended to motivate the creative activity of 
authors and inventors . . . and to allow the public access to the products of their genius after the 
limited period of exclusive control has expired.”). 
13 See Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429 (1908) (“[I]t is the privilege 
of any owner of property to use or not use it, without question of motive.”). 
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the right to exclude others from using or producing their inventions.14 That 
exclusive right, once granted, cannot be taken away because of a right 
holder’s failure to work the patent.15 From an economic and public interest 
standpoint, however, would society not benefit from requiring patentees to 
at least make good faith efforts to make use of, distribute, or commercialize 
their patents? If the government grants an inventor a monopoly, which harms 
the marketplace and consumer welfare,16 what is wrong with requiring 
recipients of this exclusive right to actively promote the progress of the 
sciences and useful arts for the benefit of society?  
No one would argue that the federal government should take the steps 
the New York state legislature took when it revoked John Fitch’s patent after 
only one year of efforts. The government should not strip a patentee of his 
property rights and then arbitrarily reissue the patent to a different individual. 
Neither should the invention fall into the public domain if nonworking of 
the patent is proven. Rather, the United States should embrace the ideals and 
goals of patent law the New York legislature typified when it transferred the 
steamboat patent to a higher-value user—even if the methods it used in that 
redistribution of rights were ill-advised.  
As established in the Intellectual Property Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution, the primary goal of patent law is to advance the public 
interest and achieve societal progress as efficiently as possible.17 Similarly, 
international trade agreements and the vast majority of foreign nations have 
recognized the great societal harms associated with nonworking of patents 
and suppression of technology.18 Mechanisms such as compulsory licensing, 
whereby “the state requires a patent holder to license his patent to another,”19 
could combat patent nonuse and technology suppression and help achieve 
the goals outlined in the U.S. Constitution. A limited use of compulsory 
licensing that compensates inventors through reasonable and marketplace-
based royalty rates will continue to incentivize inventors to develop and 
                                                            
14 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (“Every patent shall contain . . . a grant to the patentee . . . of the 
right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention . . . .”). 
15 Cont’l Paper Bag, 210 U.S. at 429-30. 
16 For a simplified discussion of the costs associated with monopolies, see Tejvan R. Pettinger, 
Disadvantages of a Monopoly, ECONOMICS HELP, http://www.economicshelp.org/microessays/markets/ 
monopoly-diagram.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2013). 
17 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. (establishing intellectual property rights “[t]o promote 
the Progress of Science and useful Arts”). 
18 See infra Part III. 
19 Joseph A. Yosick, Compulsory Patent Licensing for Efficient Use of Inventions, 2001 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 1275, 1276. 
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disclose their research and discoveries to the public.20 Meanwhile, compulsory 
licensing will help ensure that the highest-value users—like Livingston and 
Fulton—rather than just the inventors themselves, will once again be 
permitted to use and commercialize new and progressive technologies to 
benefit society.  
Part I of this Comment describes the constitutional foundation of the 
U.S. patent system and its purpose in granting monopolies to inventors in 
exchange for disclosure of their inventions. Part II then discusses the 
perverse incentives that patents may provide to inventors. It focuses on the 
societal problems that often arise when companies suppress technologies 
and the reasons why it might be advantageous for an inventor to decide not 
to work her patent. Part III examines international patent laws and the use 
of compulsory licensing throughout the world. Part IV discusses the history 
of Supreme Court patent jurisprudence and analyzes the reasons why 
compulsory licensing of patents has not been implemented in the United 
States. Finally, Part V argues for a limited use of compulsory licensing in 
the United States to exclusively address nonworking of patents and strategic 
suppression of inventions. A detailed structure is proposed that would 
ensure the original constitutional purpose of patents is better achieved. 
I. THE U.S. PATENT SYSTEM 
The Intellectual Property Clause of the U.S. Constitution grants 
Congress the power to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by 
securing for limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to their . . . 
Discoveries.”21 For centuries, exclusive patent rights have been granted to 
inventors for the benefit of the public. But intellectual property rights have 
continued to evolve and rise in importance as the world has shifted toward 
an increasingly knowledge-based economy. 
The grant of a patent comes with no affirmative duty on the part of the 
patent holder to use or commercialize the technology described in the 
patent’s claims.22 Instead, the patentee, after disclosing her invention, has 
the right to exclude others from using or commercializing the technology.23 
                                                            
20 See Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 406-07 (2010) (“[I]n 
many cases, inventors would actually benefit from a fixed, low royalty rate, because it would set an 
enforceable reserve price for the invention.”). 
21 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
22 See Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 428-30 (1908) (“[E]xclusion 
may be said to have been of the very essence of the right conferred by the patent, as it is the 
privilege of any owner of property to use or not use it, without question of motive.”). 
23 Id.; see also 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006) (prohibiting the unauthorized use of a “patented 
invention during the term of the patent”); Charles Allen Black, The Cure for Deadly Patent Practices: 
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But patent rights and government-granted monopolies are a means to an 
end: patents are designed to spur research, development, and inventiveness 
for the benefit of society.24 The ability to extract monopoly prices is an 
acceptable evil intended to advance technological development.25 The 
system is thus in constant tension: patents do not force rights holders to 
take any affirmative steps to work their patents, but permitting patentees to 
choose not to work their government-granted monopolies thwarts the 
Constitution’s stated goal of “promot[ing] the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts.”26  
II. HOW PATENTS CAN THWART SOCIETAL PROGRESS 
In recent years, the international intellectual property community has 
discussed at length patent law’s perceived shortcomings in relation to the 
pharmaceutical industry. Developed and developing nations have fought 
bitterly over the consequences of granting entities monopoly rights for life-
saving drugs and necessary medicines.27 Communities devastated by AIDS 
and other debilitating diseases have argued passionately that it is abhorrent 
on a moralistic level for pharmaceutical companies to value profit over 
thousands, or even millions, of lives.28  
                                                                                                                                     
Preventing Technology Suppression and Patent Shelving in the Life Sciences, 14 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 
397, 401-02 (2004) (“[P]atents give inventors monopolistic power to prevent non-patentees from 
making, using, selling, offering to sell, or importing the patented invention.”). 
24 For one of the most revered discussions of the true purpose of patent rights, see Justice 
Douglas’s dissent in Special Equip. Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370, 380-84 (1945) (“It is a mistake . . . to 
conceive of a patent as but another form of private property. The patent is a privilege conditioned 
by a public purpose.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
25 See Amie N. Broder, Comparing Apples to APPLs: Importing the Doctrine of Adverse Possession 
in Real Property to Patent Law, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 557, 569 (2007) (“While ensuring 
patentees recoup the costs of innovating through a right to exclude others from using one’s patent 
is also a motivation behind the patent system, the foremost justification for exclusion rights has 
always been ‘generating incentives to create.’” (citation omitted)). 
26 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
27 For a more detailed discussion of patent issues related to the pharmaceutical industry and 
the advantages and disadvantages of using compulsory licensing to address international medical 
concerns, see generally Kristina M. Lybecker & Elisabeth Fowler, Compulsory Licensing in Canada 
and Thailand: Comparing Regimes to Ensure Legitimate Use of the WTO Rules, 37 J.L. MED. & 
ETHICS 222 (2009). 
28 See Yosick, supra note 19, at 1289 (recognizing that patent protection for drugs can cause 
prices to skyrocket, which decreases their availability and thereby harms people in developing 
countries who may suffer from life-threatening but treatable diseases); Dee Hon, Battles with Big 
Pharma, ADBUSTERS, Aug. 15, 2007, available at http://www.adbusters.org/magazine/73/Battles_with_ 
Big_Pharma.html (discussing how, with the support of former President Bill Clinton, “Thailand 
and Brazil began overriding the patents for a costly new AIDS medicine from Merck”). For a 
discussion of how even the United States considered a form of compulsory licensing of “any 
invention relating to health care” in response to the Anthrax scare of 2001, see Kirby W. Lee, 
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Whether compulsory licensing should be used to combat the exorbitant 
prices pharmaceutical companies often charge during a drug’s patent term is 
outside the scope of this Comment.29 Rather, this Comment’s main focus is 
situations in which a patentee fails to work her patent or consciously 
suppresses potentially beneficial technologies to the public’s detriment. 
Such purely financial decisions could hinder efficient progress of the arts and 
sciences and may even deprive society of life-changing advancements for 
decades, until the patents expire.  
A. Patent Nonuse and Technology Suppression 
Patent law assumes that patentees will exploit their patents in order to 
benefit financially from government-granted monopoly rights. Studies 
estimate, however, that between forty and ninety percent of issued patents 
are never used or licensed by their owners during their terms.30 By weakening 
intellectual property rights on a limited scale, Congress can ensure that 
patents are made available to the highest-value users who can help achieve 
efficient societal innovation and progress.31 
“Patent nonuse occurs when a patentee fails to commercialize its patent,” 
which may happen for a number of reasons.32 Some patents simply “ha[ve] 
no present commercial value.”33 Sometimes licensing negotiations with 
competitors or strategic partners will not be mutually beneficial and will 
ultimately fail.34 Under these circumstances, the market seems to be signaling 
that these patents are not worth the expense and effort of commercialization. 
                                                                                                                                     
Note, Permitted Use of Patented Inventions in the United States: Why Prescription Drugs Do Not Merit 
Compulsory Licensing, 36 IND. L. REV. 175, 175-76 (2003). For a more thorough discussion of 
compulsory licensing for pharmaceuticals under TRIPS, see generally Jon Matthews, Renewing 
Healthy Competition: Compulsory Licenses and Why Abuses of the TRIPS Article 31 Standards Are Most 
Damaging to the United States Healthcare Industry, 4 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 119 (2010). 
29 For one analysis of this question, see Richard A. Epstein & F. Scott Kieff, Questioning the 
Frequency and Wisdom of Compulsory Licensing for Pharmaceutical Patents, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 71, 80-
83 (2011), arguing that a compulsory licensing regime for pharmaceutical patents is untenable 
because it would leave pharmaceutical companies unable to cover the fixed costs of developing and 
distributing new drugs. 
30 See Kurt M. Saunders, Patent Nonuse and the Role of Public Interest as a Deterrent to Technology 
Suppression, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 389, 391 n.10 (2002) (citing numerous sources and studies that 
estimate the percentage of unused patents in practice).  
31 See Broder, supra note 25, at 569 (arguing that intellectual property rights given to an inventor 
should be only as strong as necessary to spur subsequent innovation). 
32 Saunders, supra note 30, at 391-92. 
33 Id. at 391. But see Sichelman, supra note 20, at 344 (noting that, according to one survey, 
though “40% of the patents held by respondents were uncommercialized[,] . . . 32% of these 
patents were either commercially ‘very important’ or ‘quite important’” (citation omitted)). 
34 See id. at 391-92.  
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But patent nonuse can also arise from anticompetitive and strategic behaviors, 
where patentees deliberately suppress products or processes from the 
market to benefit financially.35  
The past century is rife with examples of powerful companies making 
strategic decisions that, for decades, deprived society of key advancements 
in technology.36 Technology suppression and patent nonuse occur not only 
through strategic decisions made by original patent holders, but also by 
companies, threatened by new patented technologies, that wish to block 
their entry into the marketplace by acquiring the patent rights through 
licensing.37  
A company may choose to resist radical innovations it perceives as a 
threat to the status quo, or new developments that may disrupt its industry 
power and prestige.38 A company’s shelved patent may have more economic 
value because the company can generate more revenue from litigation-
enforced patent licensing than by marketing the patented technology.39 
Patentees may also choose to block or fence a core technology by patenting 
potential market substitutes that competing companies could otherwise 
produce.40 Lastly, companies may seek to avoid political or labor union backlash 
by suppressing “new technolog[ies] that will de-skill or displace workers.”41 
B. Consequences and Solutions 
Proponents of strong intellectual property rights point to the quid pro 
quo that patent law represents: in exchange for disclosure, patent holders 
                                                            
35 See id. at 392. 
36 See Sichelman, supra note 20, at 343 (“[M]any of the twentieth century’s greatest inventions, 
including the television, radio, radar, and penicillin, were not commercialized until decades after 
they were invented.”).  
37 See Saunders, supra note 30, at 414, 418-22 (explaining how exclusive licensees can “lock 
away the invention by refusing to use the patent or develop and commercialize the invention” and 
discussing numerous ways and reasons that licensees may strategically suppress patents).  
38 See JAMES DYSON, AGAINST THE ODDS: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 247-49 (2d ed. 2001) 
(explaining that a company may purchase or license a patent to “take it off the shelf to make sure 
nobody else uses it”); cf. Sichelman, supra note 20, at 364 (citing a European Commission survey 
of over 9000 European inventors finding thirty-eight percent of patents were unused by the 
inventors or licensed to other entities despite the majority of the patents being deemed valuable or 
important). 
39 See Jeff John Roberts, Patent Troll Says It Owns GPS, Sues Foursquare, GIGAOM (July 26, 2012, 
4:00 PM), http://gigaom.com/2012/07/26/patent-troll-says-it-owns-gps-sues-foursquare (discussing a 
notable recent example of a “non-practicing entity” acquiring and enforcing patents through a 
strategic suit).  
40 See Sichelman, supra note 20, at 344 (“Because early patent grants reward the best inventor, 
but not necessarily the best commercializer, broad claims can impose unwarranted burdens on third-
party commercializers.”).  
41 Saunders, supra note 30, at 419-20. 
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have the unfettered right to choose whether, when, and how their property 
will be used.42 But, the primary purpose of patent law according to the 
Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution is to promote the progress of 
science and the useful arts—not to provide maximum economic compensation 
for rights holders.43 Considering the example of Liggett & Myers Company, 
which patented a way to remove the majority of carcinogens from cigarette 
smoke during the 1960s and suppressed it until 2001, it is extremely difficult 
to argue that the conscious sacrifice of millions of lives over several decades 
was a reasonable tradeoff for protecting the strength and profitability of the 
cigarette industry.44  
Scholars, therefore, have recognized the law’s failure to “consider seriously 
or to respond to the problem of technology suppression.”45 Consumers incur 
welfare losses when rights holders suppress beneficial patents or neglect to 
use them over their terms. This can delay or even preclude the public’s 
enjoyment of new technologies and progressive inventions.46 Additionally, 
patent suppression can hinder or prevent incremental innovations and 
improvements to original inventions that could otherwise lead to important 
discoveries and developments.47  
Nevertheless, Congress has, for the most part, chosen to ignore our patent 
system’s perverse incentives for businesses, establishing that intentional 
nonuse of a patent by its owner or licensee is not an actionable misuse of 
patent rights.48 But in recent years, it seems several Supreme Court Justices 
have begun to recognize the dangers inherent in the patent system’s right of 
exclusion with no requirement of production.49 In certain circumstances, 
they have recommended damages in lieu of injunctions to combat the 
                                                            
42 See Sichelman, supra note 20, at 377-78 (noting that “disclosure is the ‘quid pro quo of the 
right to exclude,’” but observing that “there is relatively little social value to disclosure as an end in 
itself: technical knowledge put to no use is not worth much” (citation omitted)). 
43 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
44 See Saunders, supra note 30, at 393-95 (discussing the strategic considerations of cigarette 
companies that suppressed such research and patents for over thirty years). For another situation 
in which technology suppression harmed the public, see id. at 395-96, in which the author 
discusses how Amgen suppressed “a wonderful advance that could save hundreds of thousands of 
children from anemia and death” to preserve the market for their lucrative but less effective 
patented drug.  
45 Id. at 396.  
46 Id. at 419. 
47 Id. 
48 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4) (2006) (declaring that it is not patent misuse to “refus[e] to 
license or use any rights to the patent”). 
49 See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396-97 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(“An industry has developed in which firms use patents not as a basis for production and selling 
goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees.”). 
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detrimental effects of patent holdups in various sectors of society.50 As the 
international community further shifts toward a knowledge-based economy, 
thus relying on intellectual property to a greater extent, compulsory licensing 
should be employed more readily as a means of social engineering to better 
promote technology competition and innovation.51 
III. COMPULSORY LICENSING FOR PATENTS IN THE  
INTERNATIONAL ARENA 
The majority of WTO member nations have more fully embraced and 
utilized compulsory licensing than the United States has, permitting 
compulsory licensing of patents in international trade agreements.52 Under 
Article 5 of the Paris Convention, member countries may grant compulsory 
licenses to prevent abuses that may result from a patent holder’s exercise of 
exclusive patent rights.53 The grant of a nonexclusive compulsory license to 
entities that intend to use the patent in the domestic market, therefore, is 
meant to combat abusive patent practices, including the failure of a patent 
holder to work a patent.54  
Article 5 of the Paris Convention, however, establishes that a compulsory 
license cannot be issued for failure to work a patent for at least four years 
after the patent application is filed or three years after the patent is issued.55 
The compulsory license can be denied if the patentee provides legitimate 
legal, economic, or technical reasons for nonuse.56 In essence, compulsory 
licenses are available under the Paris Convention to encourage use of 
inventions in domestic markets and to ensure that the public is not prevented 
from benefiting from new and progressive technologies and inventions.57 
                                                            
50 See id.; see also infra Section IV.B. 
51 See generally Saunders, supra note 30, at 397, 434-49 (discussing why compulsory licensing 
of patent rights is in the public interest).  
52 Id. at 438; see also Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 5(A)(2)–
(4), Mar. 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T. 1583 (as revised at Stockholm on July 14, 1967) [hereinafter Paris 
Convention] (providing for the issuance of compulsory licenses to prevent abuses). 
53 See id. 
54 See Saunders, supra note 30, at 436-37.  
55 Paris Convention, supra note 52, at art. 5(A)(4). 
56 Id. 
57 See Saunders, supra note 30, at 436-37 (“The Convention makes clear that the purpose of having 
a compulsory licensing statute is to protect intellectual property from being suppressed or neglected 
within the country of interest simply because the owner is unwilling or unable to exploit it.”).  
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A. Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 
In 1993, the Uruguay Round of the General Agreements on Tariffs and 
Trade established the TRIPS Agreement,58 which ultimately led to the 
adoption of the twenty-year patent term in the United States.59 More 
important, however, it acknowledged that member countries are permitted 
to use certain patents without the rights holder’s authorization, within 
limits, when necessary “to protect public health and nutrition, . . . to 
promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance . . . [, and] to prevent 
the abuse of intellectual property rights.”60 Such abuse may include a patentee’s 
imposition of unreasonable terms or engagement in practices that could 
“adversely affect the international transfer of technology.”61  
TRIPS does place some limits on compulsory licensing: “Members may 
provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent, 
provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal 
exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate 
interests of the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of 
third parties.”62 Specifically, a compulsory license is grantable, in addition to 
other requirements, if (1) authorization is considered on the individual 
merits; (2) the applicant has made efforts to obtain a license from the 
patentee on reasonable commercial terms, and such efforts have failed 
within a reasonable period of time; (3) the compulsory license is nonexclusive 
and nonassignable; (4) it is primarily for use in the domestic market; and 
(5) the patentee receives “adequate remuneration” based on the economic 
value of the nonexclusive license that is to be granted.63 Further, the “legal 
validity” of any decision authorizing unlicensed use of a patented invention 
and establishing the requisite royalty rate must be subject to judicial review 
or other independent review in the member state’s jurisdiction.64  
B. International Use and Acceptance of Compulsory Licensing 
Consistent with the provisions of the Paris Convention and the TRIPS 
Agreement, “the overwhelming majority of countries that belong to the 
[WTO] have enacted compulsory licensing as part of their patent laws.”65 
                                                            
58 See generally TRIPS, supra note 11. 
59 Yosick, supra note 19, at 1285. 
60 TRIPS, supra note 11, at art. 8.  
61 Id. 
62 Id. at art. 30. 
63 Id. at art. 31(a), (b), (e), (f) & (h). 
64 See id. at art. 31(i)–(j). 
65 Saunders, supra note 30, at 438-39.  
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Additionally, “some countries resort to compulsory licensing as a remedy for 
antitrust or misuse.”66 Countries have turned to compulsory licensing for 
food, medicine, and other patents to overcome such market failures as rights 
holders blocking dependent or improvement patents through 
anticompetitive or strategic company behavior or refusing altogether to 
work or license their patents.67 These countries have permitted compulsory 
licensing for these types of inventions for a variety of reasons: “to protect 
national security by ensuring an adequate supply of medicine, especially to 
combat devastating diseases like AIDS; to avoid the high costs of new drugs 
which developing countries cannot afford; and to encourage the retention of 
scientists and the development of a local pharmaceutical industry.”68  
Further, powerful and developed countries such as the United Kingdom 
permit compulsory licensing in a variety of situations outside the 
pharmaceutical context. Such licensing is permitted when a patentee refuses 
to license its patent on reasonable terms or its refusal to license prejudices 
“the establishment or development of commercial or industrial activities in 
the United Kingdom.”69 In Japan, compulsory licensing is permitted when a 
patent has not been worked for three years and where working is “particularly 
necessary for the public interest.”70 As the Indian pharmaceutical industry 
developed, compulsory licensing was utilized to encourage the local working 
of inventions for the benefit of the domestic economy.71 Lastly, Germany 
continues to allow compulsory licensing if “(1) the person seeking a license 
has unsuccessfully endeavored during a reasonable period of time to obtain 
from the patentee consent to use the invention under reasonable conditions 
usual in trade; and (2) public interest commands the grant of a compulsory 
                                                            
66 Id. For more information regarding the U.S. patent misuse doctrine, see generally 35 
U.S.C. § 271(d) (2006).  
67 See Black, supra note 23, at 404 (“[M]any countries will allow compulsory licensing for 
certain technologies related to food production and drugs . . . .”); cf. id. at 429-30 (discussing the 
failure of market solutions with respect to licensing in the life sciences industry). 
68 Yosick, supra note 19, at 1289; see also Black, supra note 23, at 401 (“Unlike the United 
States, these societies weigh the social right to use certain forms of technologies more heavily than 
a patentee’s right to deny the technology to the public.”). 
69 Patents Act, 1977, c. 37, § 48(a)(3)(d) (U.K.). 
70 [Tokkyohō] [Patent Act], Act No. 121 of 1959 (as amended up to Act No. 63 of 2011), art. 
83, para. 1, art. 93, para. 1 (Japan) translated in WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
ORGANIZATION LEX, available at www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=299486. 
71 For a more thorough discussion of India’s use of compulsory licensing and the changes that 
have resulted from TRIPS, see Srividhya Ragavan, Of the Inequals of the Uruguay Round, 10 MARQ. 
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 273, 290-92 (2006) (“The compulsory license provision and the government’s 
ability to issue licenses of right were meant to facilitate local manufacturing of inventions.”). 
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license.”72 Compulsory licenses will be granted to “ensure an adequate 
supply of the patented product to the domestic market” where, in addition 
to the above criteria, the “patentee does not work the patented invention or 
does not work it predominantly in Germany.” 73 Most WTO countries, in fact, 
have recognized the importance and benefits of using compulsory licensing to 
correct market failures and ensure the efficient progression of society.74 
C. The United States’ Reaction 
United States industry participants have adamantly opposed the use of 
compulsory licensing, claiming that if governments allow compulsory licenses 
to be issued, companies will be incapable of recouping the billions of dollars 
spent on the research and development necessary for innovation and 
production.75 Despite acceptance of compulsory licensing in limited 
circumstances by the vast majority of WTO members, the U.S. Congress 
has several times attempted and failed to pass a general compulsory 
licensing bill.76 In 1973, the Hart Bill was proposed, which not only would 
have established the foundation for compulsory licensing of patents related 
to “public health, safety, energy, or protection of the environment,” but also 
would have granted a compulsory license for any patent that went unworked 
within three years of issuance or within four years of the application’s filing 
date.77 This bill, as well as many other proposals in recent years, ultimately 
failed in the face of strong opposition from technology-heavy industries and 
patent practitioners.78 As a result, Congress continues to neglect the 
problems of technology suppression and unworked patents.79  
                                                            
72 See Patentgesetz [PatG] [Patent Act], May 5, 1936, BGBL. I, last amended by Gesetz [G], 
Jul. 31, 2009, BGBL. I at 2521, art. 24 (Ger.), translated in WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
ORGANIZATION LEX, available at www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=238776. 
73 Id. 
74 See Yosick, supra note 19, at 1289-90. 
75 See id. at 1276 (“Although common in other countries, including Japan, Germany, and the 
United Kingdom, [compulsory licensing] is rarely applied in the United States.”). But see Black, 
supra note 23, at 403 (explaining that, in the United States, “the government may ‘march-in’ if a 
producer cannot meet the public health needs,” and that “doctors and hospitals are granted 
immunity from damages for infringing medical patents used to care for patients”). 
76 Saunders, supra note 30, at 439-40. 
77 See S. 814, 94th Cong. § 7 (1975) (declaring it “an unfair act or practice . . . for the owner of 
a United States patent, or any licensee having sublicensing rights thereunder, to refuse or fail to 
license such patent . . . to any applicant in the United States on reasonable and nondiscriminatory 
terms, when the effect of such refusal or failure may be substantially to lessen actual or potential 
commerce”); see also Yosick, supra note 19 at 1278 (discussing the opposition to and failure of the 
Hart Bill and similar legislation). 
78 See Yosick, supra note 19, at 1278. 
79 See id. at 1278-79 (chronicling the absence of compulsory licensing legislation). 
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IV. U.S. OPPOSITION TO COMPULSORY LICENSING 
While the United States has turned to compulsory licensing in certain 
limited circumstances, the government has generally abhorred the limiting 
of intellectual property rights and patent monopolies.80 Critics of compulsory 
licensing argue that the threat of compelled use and the weakening of patent 
rights would reduce individuals’ and companies’ incentives to develop and 
disclose new inventions for the benefit of society.81 They fear that the main 
purpose of the patent system, to promote innovation and encourage 
disclosure of inventions, would be undermined.82 Additional arguments 
against compulsory licensing have ranged from claims that there is no 
evidence of wrongful suppression of patented technology under the current 
system to characterization of compulsory licensing as “socialism run 
rampant.”83 Some even believe that compulsory licensing “strikes at the very 
foundation of the patent system.”84 
However, numerous studies have cast doubt on these critiques and 
predictions.85 Some scholars have noted that compulsory licensing can 
                                                            
80 See id. at 1277 (“The U.S. patent system has generally been hostile toward the practice of 
compulsory licensing.”). 
81 See Saunders, supra note 30, at 438 n.289 (“The premise here is that invention and innovation 
would be reduced without the reward of a twenty-year term of exclusivity. . . . [T]his position is 
bound closely with the linkage of patent protection to property rights theory.”); Yosick, supra note 
19, at 1291-92 (discussing arguments that compulsory licensing would discourage innovation by 
decreasing the return on investment, and would encourage secrecy to avoid licensing). 
82 As Professor Oppenheimer explained, 
The fundamental exchange required by utility patent law is the inventor’s surrender 
of a trade secret in exchange for the patent, promoting progress . . . by putting the 
public in possession of information that the inventor could have withheld and giving 
the inventor the incentive of an assured term of exclusive control over the invention. 
Max Stul Oppenheimer, The Time and Place for “Technology-Shifting” Rights, 14 MARQ. INTELL. 
PROP. L. REV. 269, 285 (2010) (citations omitted).  
83 Yosick, supra note 19, at 1278 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
84 STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHTS, S. COMM. ON THE 
JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., 2D SESS., STUDY NO. 12, COMPULSORY LICENSING OF PATENTS—A 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 9-10 (Comm. Print 1958). 
85 See F.M. SCHERER, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF COMPULSORY PATENT LICENSING 
(1977) (discussing the economic impact of compulsory patent licensing schemes on businesses); 
F.M. Scherer, Comment, in COMPETITION POLICY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN 
THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 104, 105-108 (Robert D. Anderson & Nancy T. Gallini eds., 
1998) (analyzing the relationship between R&D expenditures and compulsory licensing and 
finding that, contrary to expectations, there was “a statistically significant elevation of . . . R&D” 
in “companies subjected to compulsory licensing”); see also Yosick, supra note 19, at 1292 (explaining 
that the arguments that compulsory licensing would erode the foundation of the patent system, 
“however, overestimate the effects of a compulsory licensing system and would occur only in a 
system that grants licenses very liberally”). But see C.T. TAYLOR & Z.A. SILBERSTON, THE 
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 349-50 (1973) (concluding that a narrowly tailored 
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actually provide a strong incentive for patentees and interested licensees to 
better use patents that otherwise would not be commercialized.86 
Additionally, not only can compulsory licensing serve a market-channeling 
function, but it also prevents high transaction costs and bilateral monopolies 
from thwarting beneficial technology transactions. A limited and controlled 
threat of compulsory licensing could encourage parties to eventually come 
to an agreement themselves rather than resort to costly litigation or 
nonworking of the patent.87 The Atomic Energy Act contains a provision 
for compulsory licensing of inventions in the public interest related to 
atomic energy,88 and the Clean Air Act contains a similar provision for 
inventions related to air pollution. 89 Thus, it seems that legislators are open to 
considering compulsory licensing when the provisions are narrowly tailored and 
for the public interest.  
A. The Development of U.S. Patent Jurisprudence 
Nineteenth-century courts recognized and embraced compulsory licensing 
for patents in a wide array of circumstances. Early federal court decisions 
recognized that “under a patent which gives a patentee a monopoly, he is 
bound either to use the patent himself or allow others to use it on reasonable 
or equitable terms.”90 Focusing on the primary purpose of patents, other 
courts recognized that a patentee that “refuses to allow others to make 
useful [inventions] is not within the spirit of the provision of the constitution 
which assigns as a reason for securing exclusive rights to authors and 
inventors a desire to promote the progress of science and the useful arts.”91  
When the issue finally reached the Supreme Court in the early twentieth 
century, however, a landmark decision validated patent nonuse as a legitimate 
                                                                                                                                     
compulsory licensing regime would slightly discourage patenting and disclosure and would have 
only a marginal impact on the U.K. economy, while significantly lowering R&D across several 
sectors of the economy). 
86 Saunders, supra note 30, at 441 (noting that compulsory licensing “may also introduce dynamic 
efficiencies by reducing expenditures on uneconomic invent-around R&D”); Yosick, supra note 19 
at 1293-1301 (arguing that compulsory licensing would be particularly effective at encouraging 
domestic use of patents and resolving “blocking patents”).  
87 See Yosick, supra note 19 at 1293-98 (discussing the societal consequences incurred when 
parties with overlapping patent claims fail to effectuate beneficial transactions or resort to 
litigation to settle licensing disputes). 
88 42 U.S.C. § 2183 (2006 & Supp. V 2012). 
89 Id. § 7608 (2006 & Supp. V 2012). 
90 Hoe v. Knap, 27 F. 204, 212 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1886). 
91 Ewart Mfg. Co. v. Baldwin Cycle-Chain Co., 91 F. 262, 265 (D. Mass. 1898) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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exercise of patent rights.92 In subsequent decades, the Court consistently 
recognized that a patentee is not obligated to use or allow others to use a 
patent.93 Over the past century, American companies have strategically 
utilized patents to suppress competing technologies that could have potentially 
changed the way consumers live.94 Toward the latter part of the twentieth 
century, the Supreme Court suggested that the public interest may provide 
a basis for compulsory licensing, but this occurred in the unique context of 
antitrust violations.95 The Department of Justice Antitrust Division and the 
Federal Trade Commission often condition approval of large mergers on the 
licensing of certain patents to competitors.96 However, for the most part, 
patent suppression and nonuse has become an accepted intellectual property 
practice, despite its potential to drastically harm the public.  
B. Signs of Hope 
With the recent international expansion of patent rights and the United 
States’ position at the forefront of intellectual property rights development, 
several Supreme Court Justices have revealed a newfound recognition of the 
dangers inherent in the U.S. patent system.97 One such danger stems from 
                                                            
92 The Supreme Court explained,  
As to the suggestion that competitors were excluded from the use of the new patent, 
we answer that such exclusion may be said to have been of the very essence of the 
right conferred by the patent, as it is the privilege of any owner of property to use or 
not use it, without question of motive.  
Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429 (1908). 
93 See, e.g., Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 432 (1945) (“[A patentee] 
has no obligation either to use [the patent] or to grant its use to others.”); Special Equipment Co. 
v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370, 378-79 (1945) (“This Court has consistently held that failure of the patentee 
to make use of a patented invention does not affect the validity of the patent.”); Woodbridge v. 
United States, 263 U.S. 50, 55 (1923) (noting that “a patentee is not obliged either to make, use or 
vend his invention during the period of his monopoly” (citations omitted)); Crown Die & Tool 
Co. v. Nye Tool & Mach. Works, 261 U.S. 24, 34 (1923) (asserting as a “clearly established 
principle[]” the idea that Congress has not placed an “express statutory imposition upon the 
patentee . . . to make, use or vend his patented invention as a condition of receiving his patent”). 
94 See Sichelman, supra note 20, at 358 (explaining the dangers of technology suppression, 
noting that “[i]f an original patentee can block subsequent product improvements by others, there 
will be diminished ex ante incentives for others” to innovate and provide new products to 
consumers). 
95 See generally United States v. Glaxo Grp. Ltd., 410 U.S. 52 (1973) (recognizing compulsory 
licensing at reasonable royalty rates as a permissible antitrust remedy). 
96 Saunders, supra note 30, at 447. 
97 See, e.g., eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396-97 (2006) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (noting that injunctive relief may not always serve the public interest because “[a]n 
industry has developed in which firms use patents not as a basis for producing and selling goods 
but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees”). 
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the numerous nonpracticing entities that have profited greatly over the past 
few decades. Nonpracticing entities do not bring products to market; rather, 
they derive revenue from patents by enforcing their intellectual property 
rights against alleged infringers.98 As a result, patent holdups99 have 
increasingly affected technology-heavy industries, as nonpracticing entities 
threaten and coerce parties into licensing patents or exiting the market to 
avoid engaging in costly, high-stakes litigation.100  
Courts have therefore begun to embrace the wide discretion available to 
them in remedying patent infringement. Until the early twenty-first 
century, courts in the vast majority of circumstances granted permanent 
injunctions for patent infringement, whether or not the patentee had been 
using or commercializing the invention.101 But following the Supreme 
Court’s decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,102 federal courts have 
begun adopting a compulsory license doctrine that largely follows the 
Second Circuit and Justice Kennedy’s concurring approach.103  
The eBay majority decision established that courts should apply the 
traditional four-factor test for injunctive relief in cases of patent 
infringement.104 Of particular note is Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, which 
advocates strongly against automatically affirming a patentee’s absolute right 
to exclude through injunctions in cases of nonpracticing patentees.105 When 
patent holders attempt to leverage the threat of a court-issued injunction 
into a presuit settlement, Kennedy urges courts instead to grant damages of 
                                                            
98 See Broder, supra note 25, at 572 (“[Nonpracticing] entities arguably invest nothing in the 
innovation, except the cost of acquiring the patent and the cost of pursuing potential infringers.”). 
99 Patent holdups occur when companies cannot produce certain products because they “read 
on” a patent that the patentee refuses to license. Troy L. Gwartney, Note, Harmonizing the 
Exclusionary Rights of Patents with Compulsory Licensing, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1395, 1403 (2009); 
see also id. at 1436 (citing study results finding that “[n]onpracticing entities file 30-40% of all 
patent suits in the computing and electronics industries” (alteration in original)). 
100 See generally eBay, 547 U.S. at 395-97 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
101 See id. at 391 (majority opinion) (noting the “general rule that courts will issue permanent 
injunctions against patent infringement absent exceptional circumstances” (quoting MercExchange, 
L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005))). 
102 547 U.S. 388. 
103 See, e.g., Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs., 512 F.3d 1363, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (approving a 
reasonable royalty award and vacating an injunction); Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 2006 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61600, at *11-15 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2006) (determining that a reasonable royalty 
would be adequate compensation and refusing to assume irreparable harm for an injunction); see 
also Jaideep Venkatesan, Compulsory Licensing of Nonpracticing Patentees After eBay v. MercExchange, 
14 VA. J.L. & TECH. 26, 31 (2009) (“These courts have decided, though not always expressly, that 
a nonpracticing patentee is entitled only to the royalty it would have earned had the parties 
executed a license . . . .”). 
104 See eBay, 547 U.S. at 391-93. 
105 See id. at 395-97 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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reasonable royalties.106 In response to Justice Kennedy and others’ belief 
that royalties and damages may be sufficient to adequately compensate 
aggrieved patentees, lower courts, including the Federal Circuit,107 have 
begun to embrace compulsory licensing by regularly denying injunctive relief 
to nonworking patent holders.108  
The Supreme Court thus signaled that strategic and detrimental patent 
enforcement behavior should not be tolerated when it stands in sharp 
opposition to the public interest. This Comment contends that compulsory 
licensing can ensure that individuals will still be compensated for their 
investments and inventive labor through the establishment of a reasonable 
royalty rate, while efficient commercialization practices and increased use of 
emerging technologies will benefit society.109 It may be wise for the federal 
government to heed the Supreme Court’s wisdom, as well as the practices of 
the majority of foreign nations, and recognize the value of compulsory 
licensing in today’s world.  
V. COMPULSORY LICENSING TO ENSURE SOCIETAL PROGRESS 
The incentives created by the patent system and the public’s interest in 
technological progress and competition must be better aligned. The United 
States’ acceptance and limited use of compulsory licensing serves as a 
powerful example of the proper way to limit a patentee’s right to exclude. 
Congress, therefore, should reorient its view of patent law and once again 
focus on the development of science and the useful arts while protecting the 
proper incentive level for inventors.110  
                                                            
106 Id. 
107 See, e.g., Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1313-15 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“Under 
some circumstances, awarding an ongoing royalty for patent infringement in lieu of an injunction 
may be appropriate.”). 
108 For a further discussion of the lower courts’ decisions embracing this approach, see 
Venkatesan, supra note 103, at 39-40. See also Daniel J. Iden, Note, Combating Joint Ventures in 
Suppression: Taking Inventory of the Legal Arsenal, 96 MINN. L. REV. 278, 290-91 (2011) (noting that 
“consideration of public interest when . . . determining whether or not to apply a compulsory 
licensing regime . . . seems to have found some traction among courts, at least in effect,” following 
eBay). 
109 Cf. Sichelman, supra note 20, at 363 (“[A]bout only 5% of issued patents are licensed for a 
royalty. . . . These low rates of licensing . . . are further evidence of under-commercialization.”). 
110 See Yosick, supra note 19, at 1300-01 (“It is important that compulsory licensing be allowed 
only where truly necessary to promote the public interest, while not significantly reducing the 
incentive to develop new technology.”). 
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A. The Benefits of Compulsory Licensing 
Compulsory licensing should be imposed in only limited circumstances—
specifically, where overwhelming hardship to the public outweighs the 
benefits to the patent holder. The threat and actual imposition of a reasonable 
and equitable royalty rate can help overcome the high transaction costs, 
bilateral monopolies, and psychological failures that often prevent parties 
from reaching agreements.111 Therefore, when patent holders fail to 
commercialize their intellectual property after a reasonable period of time, 
such patents should be subject to compulsory licensing for the benefit of 
society.112  
Patentees who are unable or unwilling to acquire the resources necessary 
to bring the product to market or fail to find a suitable licensee should be 
subject to the market-forcing mechanism of compulsory licensing. Not only 
would products that would otherwise be shelved or suppressed for the 
patent term come to market, but they would presumably be offered at more 
competitive prices. The mere threat of compulsory licensing for nonuse 
would likely reduce the incidence of patent suppression and nonworking by 
persuading entities to overcome conflicts and issue licenses based on their 
own price valuations.113 
Critics may argue that compulsory licensing would reduce investment in 
innovation by defeating inventors’ ability to extract monopoly profits. But 
compulsory licensing would occur only in a very limited number of 
circumstances and only when a patentee is unable or unwilling to bring the 
invention to market. The ex ante incentive to invent should therefore 
remain strong, as few inventors consciously research, develop, and patent 
inventions with an already-established desire to suppress the product for the full 
patent term.114 With compulsory licensing for the remainder of the patent term, 
                                                            
111 See supra note 87 and accompanying text. Note that TRIPS requires companies to have 
already attempted to obtain a license from the patentee before a compulsory license can be issued. 
See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
112 See Sichelman, supra note 20, at 406-07 (“If the invention patentee or a licensee did not 
commercialize by . . . roughly five to eight years after filing[ ]it seems difficult to argue that 
providing that opportunity to a third party willing to do so under a low, but reasonable, royalty 
prejudices the patentee.”). 
113 See Eric Bond & Kamal Saggi, Compulsory Licensing, Price Controls, and Access to Patented 
Foreign Products 4 (Vanderbilt Univ. Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper No. 12-00006, 2012), available at 
http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/VUECON/VUECON-12-00006.pdf (“[C]ompulsory licensing need 
not actually be used: the threat to issue a compulsory license can affect the behavior of patent-
holders . . . .”). 
114 Cf., e.g., Richard Tyler, Inventor Fury as Patents Prove Too Costly to Defend, TELEGRAPH 
(Mar. 8, 2012), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/yourbusiness/9130815/Inventor-fury-as-patents-
prove-too-costly-to-defend.html (quoting a technology broker who explained that he had “come to 
the view that the only reason [small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)] should seek a patent 
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rights holders would continue to reap the fruits of their labor by recouping at 
least some of the costs incurred during research and development.115 In fact, 
establishing competitive rates without engaging in costly negotiations and 
incurring other transaction costs with interested licensees may lead to 
greater net profits for inventors.116  
B. Proposed Framework 
To ensure fairness and stability, patents should not be subject to the 
threat of compulsory licensing until patentees have been given a reasonable 
opportunity to use, commercialize, license, or assign their patents for use in the 
marketplace. Based on the pharmaceutical industry’s passionate arguments that 
compulsory licensing undermines the ability to recoup the billions of dollars 
spent on research and development of new drugs, compulsory licensing should 
not be considered for the first eight years of the patent term. This safe-
haven period would be granted to all patents, no matter the industry, and 
would actually be much longer than the time limitations placed on 
compulsory licensing by certain countries under TRIPS.117  
After eight years, companies should be required to file a short document 
or statement detailing efforts to use, develop, or commercialize the patent, 
by either the original patent holder or a licensee.118 This report could be 
filed at the same time as payment of the patent’s maintenance fees. Under 
the current structure, fees are due at the three-, seven-, and eleven-year 
marks.119 But to better align fees with the proposed compulsory licensing 
framework, I recommend that both the fees and the evidence necessary to 
avoid compulsory licensing should be due during the eighth, eleventh, 
fourteenth, and seventeenth years of the patent term.  
                                                                                                                                     
is to create something that can be traded—hopefully to an entity who can afford to sue those who 
infringe it—unless the SME has deep pockets and limitless stamina”). 
115 See Iden, supra note 108, at 298-99 (“One of the most compelling reasons for courts to 
assign compulsory licenses in cases of technology suppression is that it would make the patent 
available for public consumption and development while still compensating the patentee.”). 
116 See id. at 299 (“Since others can develop or use the invention, the public is able to reap 
any social good able to be derived from the patent. . . . [C]ompulsory licenses might represent a 
reasonable compromise among the patentee, licensee, and the social good.” (footnote omitted)); see 
also Sichelman, supra note 20, at 406-07 (“[I]n many cases, inventors would actually benefit from a 
fixed, low royalty rate, because it would set an enforceable reserve price for the invention, which 
would reduce strategic negotiation and overall bargaining costs, increasing the odds of consummating 
a deal.”). 
117 See supra Section III.B. 
118 For a discussion of the implications of an annual reporting requirement or disclosure and 
justification to the public of nonuse, see Saunders, supra note 30, at 427-30. 
119 See 35 U.S.C. § 41(b) (2006). 
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The PTO would have to review these materials, which admittedly would 
add a heavy burden to an already overloaded system.120 To cover this 
additional cost, maintenance fees should be increased above their current 
rates and increase with each payment period. 
Upon review, the PTO would make a decision concerning whether the 
patent has been sufficiently worked or whether the inventor is making an 
effort to bring the product to market. Should the evidence submitted not 
meet the necessary level of proof, the PTO would refer the matter to a 
specialized board for a hearing to determine whether compulsory licensing 
should issue and at what rate. This would provide patentees with the 
TRIPS-required judicial review, as well as allow further evidence and expert 
testimony to be submitted regarding the working of the patent.  
The specialized board could be created either under the jurisdiction of 
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or as a separate entity to deal 
exclusively with compulsory licensing issues. In fact, copyright law took the 
latter approach when the Librarian of Congress appointed three fulltime 
Copyright Royalty Judges to the Copyright Royalty Board (CRB) to 
determine compulsory licensing rates for certain works.121  
Critics and patentees may argue that third parties and specialized boards 
will be unable to determine reasonable and fair royalty rates, or that patentees 
and interested licensees are better evaluators of the worth of patents.122 
Justice Kennedy, with three other Justices joining his concurrence, however, 
opined that “legal damages may well be sufficient to compensate for the 
infringement,” suggesting that courts are capable of determining and 
imposing reasonable royalty rates in a variety of contexts, including patent 
infringement suits.123 If a CRB-type board is established for patent compulsory 
licensing, greater expertise is likely to be developed. Specialized judges 
                                                            
120 See Andrew Brandt, Patent Overload Hampers Tech Innovation, PCWORLD (Feb. 27, 2006), 
http://www.pcworld.com/article/124826/article.html (discussing the severe patent backlog facing 
the U.S. PTO). 
121 See 17 U.S.C. § 114(f) (2006) (outlining types of transmissions subject to compulsory 
licensing by the CRB); id. § 801 (2006 & Supp. V 2012) (authorizing the appointment and 
function of Copyright Royalty Judges). See generally id. § 111 (2006 & Supp. V 2012) (establishing a 
statutory license in secondary transmissions by cable television systems); id. § 112 (2006) 
(establishing a statutory license for ephemeral recordings used to facilitate digital transmissions); 
id. § 115 (2006 & Supp. V 2012) (establishing a statutory license for the reproduction and 
distribution of phonorecords of nondramatic musical works); id. § 118 (2006) (allowing a statutory 
license for the use of certain copyrighted works by noncommercial broadcasting entities); id. § 119 
(2006 & Supp. V 2012) (establishing a statutory license for satellite retransmissions to the public 
for private viewing); id. § 122 (2006 & Supp. V 2012) (establishing a statutory license for satellite 
retransmissions of local television stations’ broadcasts into local markets). 
122 See Yosick, supra note 19, at 1298. 
123 See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 395-97 (2006). 
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focused on compulsory licensing issues would help create precedents across 
a wide variety of industries, which will help establish a more accurate and 
fair system for both patentees and the public. In the process, the expertise 
and efficiency inherent in a specialized board would result in lower litigation 
costs and greater accuracy for the parties involved.  
The board likely would quickly develop expertise in compulsory licensing 
and be able to not only efficiently and accurately determine which patents 
should be subject to such licensing, but also establish reasonable royalty 
rates that represent competitive transactions between willing buyers and 
sellers in the marketplace. Following an evidentiary hearing, the board 
would determine licensing rates, considering such factors as economic 
analysis, expert testimony, past industry practices, past company practices, 
prior precedents, and market evidence. Establishing royalty rates based on 
percentages of licensee revenue will align the incentives of the patentee and 
licensee, ensuring that products are properly and efficiently commercialized. 
In addition, a revenue-based model would ensure that licensing fees do not 
exceed gross revenues for any interested party.124  
Borrowing language from the Bayh–Dole Act,125 the standard used by 
the board for determining whether compulsory licensing should be imposed 
on a specific patent should be similar to whether the patent holder “has not 
taken, or is not expected to take within a reasonable time, effective steps to 
achieve practical application of the subject invention.”126 The focus would be 
on the affirmative steps taken by the patentee, the market demand for the 
invention, and the public interest in scientific and artistic progress.127 The 
determination, however, would not take into account many of the issues, 
such as exorbitantly high prices, that are often raised in regard to the 
pharmaceutical industry. The main goal of this compulsory licensing system 
is to ensure that inventions are properly practiced. In this way, the market—
rather than the patentee—determines when and to what extent new 
technologies are incorporated into society.  
If a patentee were able to prove sufficient working of the patent to avoid 
compulsory licensing—a relatively easy burden under this structure—
                                                            
124 Such a revenue based–royalty rate model has already been implemented in the copyright 
context. See Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-321, 116 Stat. 2780, 2782 
(2002) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C §§ 101, 117 (2006 & Supp. V 2012)) (“Any such agreement 
for small commercial webcasters shall include provisions for payment of royalties on the basis of a 
percentage of revenue or expenses, or both, and include a minimum fee.”). 
125 Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 178(j), 17 
U.S.C §§ 106, 117, scattered sections of 35 U.S.C. & 42 U.S.C. § 5908). 
126 35 U.S.C. § 203(a)(1) (2006 & Supp. V 2012). 
127 See Saunders, supra note 30, at 434-36 (suggesting a similar solution that focuses on the 
anticompetitive use of patents as a prerequisite to compelled licensing).  
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judgment would be in her favor. The patentee would then be entitled to 
collateral estoppel on the judgment until the next maintenance fee period, 
immunizing the patentee from further compulsory license challenges for 
alleged nonuse or technology suppression until that date. But should this 
determination be made against the patentee, for the remainder of the patent 
term, the patentee would be required to license the invention—under a 
reasonable royalty rate—to any party that wishes to license the patent. 
Essentially, if a patentee is not using the monopoly rights that were given to 
her through the patent system, then she should not be entitled to monopoly 
profits. The goal is to ensure that the product enters the market to some 
extent, whether at the hands of the original patentee, or through compulsory 
licensing, which can help ensure both the local working of inventions and 
the diffusion of technologies.  
This structure would place decisionmaking power in the hands of 
experts who can properly analyze the anticompetitive effects of patent 
nonuse and give proper weight to the public interest in disclosure, diffusion, 
and commercialization of beneficial technologies.128 Flexibility and fairness 
in these proceedings will be crucial to ensuring that the incentive structure 
for inventors is not severely undermined.  
It may take many years to establish reasonable royalty rate frameworks 
across a wide array of highly technical industries characterized by rapid 
marketplace innovation. The threat of compulsory licensing, however, 
should result in a greater number of voluntary licensing arrangements, 
providing further evidence of what reasonable and competitive royalty rates 
are in a willing buyer-and-seller marketplace. “[T]he key is to strike a 
balance by giving enough protection to encourage innovation, but not so 
much protection that it imposes excessive social burdens.”129 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court has noted that patent law serves a number of purposes: 
to incentivize inventors to devote resources to technological development, 
to encourage innovation and commercialization of products, and to encourage 
disclosure of inventions for the benefit of society.130 The government and 
courts, however, have seemingly subordinated the public interest in favor of 
inventors’ personal economic interests. Of course, it is difficult to efficiently 
achieve all three purposes of patent law without recognizing one as being of 
                                                            
128 See id. at 436 (stating that compulsory licensing would be “more flexible than current 
antitrust and patent misuse law”).  
129 Yosick, supra note 19, at 1291. 
130 See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480-81 (1974).  
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higher importance. However, when the Constitution specifically states that 
exclusive rights are granted to promote the progress of science and the arts, the 
current patent system cannot be said to have properly balanced the inventor’s 
incentives and financial interests with the public’s interest in innovation.131  
Patents are often “understood as a type of social contract between the 
patentee and society.”132 Patent holders are granted limited monopolies in 
exchange for the disclosure of their inventions and discoveries, which foster 
technological development.133 Yet, while society may expect that a promise 
of commercialization exists, or at least that the patentee will provide 
reasonable terms for others to use or exploit her inventions, Congress has 
adamantly refused to place this burden on patent holders.134  
Patent holders are largely permitted to suppress new and beneficial 
technologies, depriving society of the benefits of commercialization. When 
patents are not worked or technologies are consciously suppressed, however, 
courts should declare that the patentee has breached the contract.135 
Technological development and efficient use of inventions through market 
forces is thwarted when patent owners fail to use, license, or assign 
intellectual property rights for the benefit of those individuals and entities 
who wish to use or improve upon the technology.  
It will not be easy to garner the necessary political and economic support 
to implement these proposed changes, but the government should be 
permitted to limit a patentee’s exclusive rights by establishing compulsory 
licensing when technology has been suppressed or a patent has been unworked. 
The patentee would still benefit financially from the reasonable royalty, and 
the public would gain earlier use of the invention.136 Compulsory licensing 
should only issue when the patent holder has no commercial use for her 
exclusive rights or has withheld inventions from the marketplace. By strictly 
construing the definitions of nonuse and suppression, compulsory licensing 
would not adversely affect the patentee’s incentive to innovate. After all, 
                                                            
131 See Oppenheimer, supra note 82, at 272-73 (“The speed of technological change, particularly 
in the converging fields of computer software, music, video, television, and communications, 
coupled with the power of technology industry lobbying, have left the statutory balance tilted in 
favor of rewarding innovators at the expense of further innovation and of consumers.”). 
132 Saunders, supra note 30, at 451.  
133 Id. 
134 See generally Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429 (1908) (noting 
that Congress was aware of the policy of penalizing nonuse in other countries, and as yet had 
elected not to implement a similar measure in the United States). 
135 See Yosick, supra note 19, at 1301. 
136 See Iden, supra note 108, at 304-05 (“[A]warding only damages—instead of injunctions—
balances the interests of the public in having use of a new invention, while still respecting the 
legitimate rights of the unused-patent holder.”). 
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economic theory and patent law assume that inventors decide ex ante to 
invent to capitalize on their labor and efforts through commercialization of 
products and extraction of monopoly profits.137 
The Constitution grants Congress the power to decide which inventions 
to protect and for how long.138 Therefore, patent rights may be subject to 
whatever qualifications and limitations Congress deems necessary.139 
Congress should therefore embrace compulsory licensing as a beneficial use 
of the power granted to it by the Constitution. By utilizing compulsory 
licensing to combat nonworking of patents and technology suppression, the 
United States will be better able to provide the proper balance between 
inventors’ and the public’s interests. Patentees will still be incentivized to 
disclose their inventions and will be compensated for their labor and 
investment. More importantly, Congress will ensure that scientific and 
artistic progress further flourish in the years ahead. 
 
 
 
                                                            
137 See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480-81 (1974). 
138 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
139 See generally TRIPS, supra note 11. 
